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Comparisons of Different Monetary Policies in China with Yield 
Curve Information 
 
This work compares the effectiveness of quantity-based and price-based monetary 
policies in China using FAVAR. This essay is the pioneer to identify the 1-year 
lending rate and deposit rate as the policy rates, and includes yield curve information 
in the analysis. It is found that effects of tightening monetary policies in China follow 
largely the stylized facts of long run neutrality of money on real activities, a long term 
fall in inflation and a short term rise in interest rates. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
China is facing the challenges of high asset inflation and price inflation during the 
ongoing recovery from the financial crisis. In this context it is useful to analyze how 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC) could limit the extension of bank credit with its 
monetary policy tools without sacrificing long term economic growth. Recent 
literature has categorized the spectrum of anti-inflationary policy tools available to the 
PBC into quantity-based, the tools that control the money supply, and price-based, the 
tools that affect saving and investment behavior through the commercial banking 
channel. This paper analyzes the impact of these quantity-based and price-based 
monetary policies on the real economy and on the control of prices in China.  
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) controls both the quantity of money and various 
price-based tools including the rediscount rate and commercial bank interest rates to 
promote economic growth and control inflation. It also controls the money supply 
through open market operations and certain administrative tools that are not market 
oriented, including setting targets for money growth and providing window guidance 
to banks.  
Another policy tool most often used by the PBC to control money supply is the 
reserve requirement ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the compulsory proportion 
of deposits that commercial banks put aside as reserves in the PBC. The central bank 
sets the reserve interest rate, which determines interest payments for commercial 
banks on required reserve. It also sets the excess reserve interest rate, which 
determines the interest payments on voluntary deposits that the commercial banks put 
aside in the PBC. Since there are excess reserves in the PBC, increasing the reserve 
requirement ratio might not be an effective tool for tightening the money supply. 
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Based on the annual target of money growth rate, the PBC conducts open-market 
operations regularly to control money supply. The central bank issues its own bonds 
and sells them in the market when it wants to tighten money supply, and buys the 
bonds back when it wants to loosen the money supply. Apart from open market 
operations, the PBC issues forced PBC bills at lower interest rate to penalize banks 
that do not follow its window guidance.  
 
Table 1. People’s Bank of China’s M2 Growth Rate Targets and Actual Value. 
 M2 Growth (%) 
Year Target Actual 
1998 16-18 15.3 
1999 14-15 14.7 
2000 14-15 12.3 
2001 15-16 14.4 
2002 13 16.8 
2003 16 19.6 
2004 17 14.6 
2005 15 17.6 
2006 14 16.9 
2007 16 16.7 
2008 16 17.8 
2009 17 27.6 
2010 17 .. 
Source: PBC (1998-2009), China Monetary Policy Report. 
 
Figure 1 Reserve Requirement Ratio controlled by PBC 
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The PBC’s most direct price-based monetary policy tools are commercial bank 
lending and deposit rates. In China these are called the benchmark interest rates. The 
benchmark lending rates are the floors of the commercial bank lending rates of 
various maturities. In practice, the commercial banks have little flexibility on the 
lending rates. The benchmark deposit rates are the ceilings of the commercial bank 
deposit rates of various maturities. The commercial banks essentially follow the 
benchmark deposit rate closely. When the PBC changes the benchmark deposit and 
lending rates, it affects the bank interest rates directly because it sets those interest 
rates, with a very limited range within which the floor for the lending rates and the 
ceiling for the deposit rates can vary.  
The central bank sets the benchmark rates of various maturities, and therefore it also 
controls the term structure or the yield curve of the benchmark rates. The change in 
the benchmark rates affects the saving and investment behaviors by making it either 
more expensive or cheaper to save or invest in the short term, medium term and long 
term. 
The reform of the PBC’s monetary policy is ongoing. The central bank has developed 
a set of price-based monetary policy tools similar to those in the developed economies. 
The PBC has discount window facilities. The rediscount rate is one of the price-based 
monetary policy tools. The PBC charges the rediscount rate when banks borrow from 
it with discount papers that have been collateralized. In 2004, the PBC was given the 
authority to change the rediscount rate prior to the State Council approval. At the time, 
the rediscount rate was considered as the central bank policy rate. However, the 
turnover of operations within the rediscount instrument is too small to have any 
significant influence on the growth of monetary base. Therefore, the rediscount policy 
essentially focuses on directing the commercial paper market (PBC, 2004a; PBC, 
2004b).  
China has also developed an interbank market as part of its financial reform. An 
interbank market is a wholesale funding market between banks and therefore the 
interbank interest rates are considered as wholesale interest rates. Lenders are 
generally state commercial banks which have more deposits to deploy. Borrowers are 
small local banks and foreign banks. 
The repo market is an interbank collateralized funding market. The interest rate 
involved is called the repo rate. Repo lending is very often active in maturities of 
overnight to 7-days, though there are 1-year repos, with activities concentrated in the 
short maturities. The collaterals can be PBC papers, treasury papers and commercial 
papers.  
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Figure 2 Benchmark Lending Rates and Deposit Rates Yield Curve. 
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The China Interbank Offered Rate (CHIBOR) market was established in 1996. It is 
for temporary account discrepancy settlement and short term funding purpose. The 
Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) market was established in 2007. The 
authorities intended to build a China interbank yield curve using SHIBOR. The repo 
rate, CHIBOR and SHIBOR follow each other very closely for all maturities. 
The volume of transactions in the repo market has been higher than the CHIBOR 
market, and the transaction in the SHIBOR market is very thin. The high transaction 
volume in the repo market is due to the PBC’s function to perform sterilization in the 
repo market.  
Since the PBC exerts quantity-based monetary policy tools together with price-based 
monetary policy tools, it is important to look at the transmission mechanism of the 
different policy tools on the real economy and inflation.  
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The existing literature tends to apply vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze the 
Chinese monetary policy mechanism. However, each study uses a different interest 
rate as the policy rate. The choice of the policy interest rate is diverse because there is 
no convention that could be followed in the case of China. The PBC sets the 
commercial lending and deposit rates, which are different from the conventional 
policy rates used in other economies. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank 
sets the target Fed funds rate and the European Central Bank sets the refinancing rate, 
both of which are interest rates that determine interest payment when banks borrow 
from the central bank. Another problem is that the PBC sets the benchmark rates of 
various maturities, which creates the problem of using a unique policy interest rate in 
China.  
Recent studies tend to agree that the simultaneous usage of the quantity-based and 
price-based monetary policy tools leads to distortions that prevent the interest rate 
channel of monetary transmission from functioning. Gieger (2006, 2008) argued that 
under the current monetary policy framework in China, the interest rate has to be 
considered as a supportive monetary instrument.  
Qin et al (2005), using the discount rate as the policy rate, found that the interest rate 
transmission channels in VAR do not influence the real economy and inflation in long 
term. Laurens and Maino (2007) found a similar result using short-term PBC bill rate 
as the policy interest rate in VAR. Dickinson and Liu (2007), using discount rate as 
the policy interest rate in VAR, found that changes in the interest rate did not have an 
impact on output and inflation during 1984 to 1990. They believe that is because 
state-owned enterprises were the main borrowers during the period. 
Using VAR and FAVAR models, Girardin and Liu (2006) found that a shock in 
CHIBOR had a significant impact on prices during 1999:01 to 2005:08, and mild 
impact on output during 1997:01 to 2005:08. 
Girardin and Liu (2006) arrived at a result similar to Qin et al (2005) that a shock in 
the reserve requirement ratio has a significant impact on the growth rate of M1. 
Qin et al (2005) found that quantity-based monetary policy tools, namely the reserve 
requirement ratio and monetary base growth, both have positive effects on GDP and 
inflation control, but that the reserve requirement ratio has a more significant impact 
on inflation control than the growth of the monetary base. Dickinson and Liu (2007) 
arrived at the same result as Qin et al (2005) that the growth rate of M2 had a direct 
impact on both real output and inflation in the 1990s as bank credits were directly 
used to support state-owned enterprises. Koivu et al (2008), modeling Chinese 
monetary policy shock with the McCallum rule, found that a money supply shock has 
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a significant and long term impact on the level of nominal GDP.  
However, Laurens and Maino (2007) found that changes in the growth rate of M2 as a 
policy tool has significant and long term impact on inflation but do not have any long 
run impact on output. Using VAR and FAVAR models, Girardin and Liu (2006) found 
that in the subsample of 1999 to 2005, a shock to the growth rate of M1 has weaker 
effects on both output and inflation compared to a shock to interest rate.  
Summing up the literature, the main divergence is found by Girardin and Liu (2006). 
The difference could be due to the fact that Girardin and Liu (2006) are the only 
authors who chose CHIBOR as the policy interest rate. Compared with CHIBOR, 
which is an interbank interest rate, the discount rate in China is closer to the 
benchmark deposit and lending rates. Interbank rates are not policy interest rates. In 
conventional markets, like those in the U.S., Europe, U.K. and Hong Kong, interbank 
rates are wholesale interest rates that affect the costs of commercial banks and 
therefore affect commercial bank interest rates, which in turn form part of the 
transmission channels through which the interest rates set by monetary policy affect 
real activities like saving and investment.  
However, the situation is very different in China where the PBC sets the commercial 
bank interest rates directly. Changes in the interbank rates in China include the results 
of changes in commercial bank interest rates and other monetary policy instruments 
(Feyzioglu et. al 2009). Porter and Xu (2009), using EGARCH and ARCH, found that 
the changes in open market operations and reserve requirement ratio have significant 
impact on the volatility of interbank rate. Therefore a shock to the interbank rate could 
be due to changes in benchmark rates, reserve required ratio and open market 
operation. That is, a change in interbank rate might represent a change in 
quantity-based policy tools. Thus, using the interbank rate as a proxy for the policy 
interest rate in China is unnecessary and inappropriate. 
Though using the discount rate as a policy rate reflects some of the changes in 
benchmark lending and deposit rates, it neglects the fact that the PBC sets deposit and 
lending rates of various maturities to control the level of lending and deposit rates as 
well as the shape of commercial bank yield curves. Being able to set different 
maturities of lending and deposit rates enables the central bank to fine-tune saving 
and investment behavior. For example, in December 2007 the PBC raised only the 
lending rates of maturities of 1-year by 0.18 percentage points but kept the 5-year 
lending rate unchanged because it wanted to deter residential property investments, 
which are linked to the 1-year lending rate, while tried not to affect long term 
investment projects.  
Page 7 / 42 
If the level of benchmark lending and deposit rates only are included in the analysis of 
the transmission mechanism of the Chinese monetary policies, then the analysis could 
end up losing the “yield curve” information.  
In this paper we look at the effectiveness of quantity-based and price-based monetary 
policies on real activities and inflation.  
Since using interbank rates or discount rates in the analysis of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in China is inappropriate, we include the benchmark 
deposit and lending rates in order to improve the analysis of the choice of the policy 
interest rate and the transmission mechanism of Chinese monetary policy. 
The objective of this paper is to include information from the “yield curve” of 
benchmark rates in our data as this is a tool that the PBC controls. Since the changes 
in the benchmark interest rates are very sporadic we do not estimate the yield curve 
from the data using methods such as Diebold and Li (2006) three factors model. 
Instead, we include the levels and spreads of benchmark rates of different maturities 
in our data (see Appendix A). These levels and spreads should contain information 
that reflects the three yield curve factors in Diebold and Li (2006), namely the level, 
slope and curvature of the yield curve.  
Our paper tries to embed the yield curve information in two ways. One is to include 
all the levels of benchmark lending and deposit rates and the spreads of different 
maturities against a 1-year rate in the dataset. The other is to extract three factors from 
benchmark rates to characterize the level, slope and curvature of the yield curve, and 
then include these three factors in the analysis. 
Since the focus of this paper is to analyze the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in China by including all the policy tools that the PBC uses, including the yield 
curve which the PBC controls, a large volume of interest rate data is involved. 
Applying a large dataset to a VAR model is problematic due to the shortcoming of 
degrees of freedom in the VAR.  
Recent literature has overcome this shortcoming of the VAR. Stock and Watson (2002) 
developed a dynamic factor model to summarize information contained in 120 
economic indicators. Based on Stock and Watson (2002), Bernanke et al (2005) 
established a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) to analyze the effect of monetary 
policy in the U.S. that can accommodate a vast dataset.  
The FAVAR framework in our paper is different from that in Girardin and Liu (2006). 
In the latter FAVAR model, the observable vector consists of industrial output, 
consumer price index, foreign reserves and a monetary policy instrument. We argue 
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that only the monetary policy instrument is observable to central banks as defined in 
Bernanke et al (2005) and that the other economic indicators should be modeled as 
part of the factors.  
Another difference between this paper and Girardin and Liu (2006) relates to the 
choice of the number of factors and the lags in modeling FAVAR. Girardin and Liu 
(2006) chose only one factor in the FAVAR framework as they found that the first 
factor explained more than 90% of the variation in their samples. They did not use 
any model selection tool in the selection of the number of factors. Regarding the issue 
of lags, Girardin and Liu (2006) chose 3 lags in their VAR model using a general 
Chi-square test against 13 lags. They used the same lag length in the FAVAR model 
without applying a separate test. In contrast, to make the selection process more 
precise, this paper applies generic information criteria to identify the number of 
factors and lags in the FAVAR model.  
In general, this paper finds that the quantity-based and price-based monetary policies 
do not have any significant long term impact on real activities. The 1-year lending 
rate has the most impact on real activities in the short term though it also does not 
have any long term impact on real activities. A shock to the growth rate of M1, the 
1-year lending rate and the 1-year deposit rate have mild long term impact on CPI 
inflation, while a shock to the reserve requirement ratio does not have long term 
impact on CPI inflation. Including yield curve factors improves the intuitiveness of 
the impulse response functions but do not generate different long term impacts. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the FAVAR model, and describes 
how we model the yield curve information in FAVAR. Section 3 provides a 
description of the dataset. Section 4 shows the empirical results. Section 5 proposes 
policy implications on the on-going financial reform in China. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The FAVAR application 
In the FAVAR, we define that there are unobservable factors that the PBC cannot 
control directly and observable factors that the PBC has control over. Therefore in the 
FAVAR all the observable factors are policy instruments. 
Let Ft be a K1 vector of unobservable factors which can summarize most of the 
information contained in a large information set Xt which is an N1 stationary time 
series variable observed for t=1,…,T ; Yt is an M1 observable policy instruments and 
is a subset of Xt.  
Ft can be interpreted as factors that affect many economic variables. These factors can 
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be extracted from the large information set in Xt. The number of informational time 
series, N, is large and may be larger than T, the number of time periods, and is 
assumed to be much larger than K+M. It is further assumed that the large information 
set is related to the unobserved factors, Ft, and the observable policy instruments, Yt: 
' ' ' 'f y
t t t tX F Y      (1) 
where f is an NK matrix of factor loadings, y is NM, t is an N1 vector of error 
terms that have mean zero and assumed to be weakly correlated.  
Equation (1) is the dynamic factor model developed by Stock and Watson (2002b). It 
implies that Xt is driven by both unobservable factors and observable policy 
instruments, and therefore Ft and Yt can be correlated. Since Xt can contain lagged 
values, Ft can be understood as containing arbitrary lags of fundamental factors. An 
advantage of the static representation of a dynamic factor model of equation (1) is that 
it can be estimated by the principal component method (Stock and Watson, 2002b). 
The joint dynamics of (Ft , Yt) are given by 
  1
1
t t
t
t t
F F
B L e
Y Y


   
    
   
 (2) 
where B(L) is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order d; et is an error term with 
mean zero and covariance matrix .  
If the terms in B(L) that relate Yt to Ft-1 are all zero, equation (2) is a standard VAR in 
Yt; otherwise equation (2) is referred by Bernanke et al (2005) as a factor-augmented 
vector autoregression (FAVAR). If the true system is a FAVAR but instead equation (2) 
is estimated as a standard VAR, that is if the factors are omitted, then the estimates in 
the standard VAR system will be biased. 
Since Ft is a vector of unobservable factors, equation (2) can only be estimated after 
Ft is derived. In our work, we apply the two-step estimation procedure in Bernanke et 
al (2005) to derive Ft in the first step and then estimate equation (2) in the second 
step. 
It is reasonable to believe that information contained in Xt can be summarized into 
several categories. We call these categories common components, Ct. In the first step 
of the two-step approach, we extract the first K+M principal components using all 
variables in Xt, and we get Ct   . However, any of the linear combinations underlying 
Ct    could involve the policy instrument, which is part of Yt. Therefore it would be 
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invalid to estimate a VAR of Ct    and Yt. We have to remove the dependence of Ct    
on the policy instrument. This requires identifying variables in Xt that are not related 
to the policy shock. 
Since fast-moving variables in the dataset Xt, are highly sensitive to policy shocks, 
fast structural shocks and contemporaneous information, such as financial news and 
economic data release, Bernanke, et al (2005) argue that there is high collinearity 
between the fast-moving variables and any policy shock. The logic implies that 
information contained in the fast-moving variables should be accounted for by the 
policy shock. On the contrary, slow-moving variables that change slowly, for example 
real estate prices and sales, are assumed to be unaffected within the month by the 
policy shock, and these variables are marked with an asterisk in the Appendix. Xt is 
therefore split into slow-moving variables, the policy shock and fast-moving 
variables.  
As the slow-moving variables are not related to the policy shock contemporaneously, 
the common components extracted from slow-moving variables, 𝐹𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤  , are also not 
related to the policy shock contemporaneously.  
We thus form 𝐶𝑡  such that 
Ct = 𝛽
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤 Ft
slow + βYYt + 𝜐t (3) 
We then remove the dependence of Ct  .on the policy instrument to get the factors, Ft , 
in equation (2) as 
Ft = Ct − βY Yt (4) 
where Ct   are principal components from Xt and β
Y 
comes from the result of 
equation (3). 
Factors, Ft , obtained in this fashion form a part of the space covered by Ct    that is 
not covered by Yt, and therefore is now valid to be entered into VAR with Yt. To 
identify the unique factors against any rotation, a restriction is imposed on factors by 
F’F/T=I1.  
In the second step, we estimate the FAVAR in equation (2) which consists of  and 
Yt.  
                                                     
1
 We can impose restrictions on the factor loadings or the factors. Either approach provides the same 
common component and the same factor space.  
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In our model, Yt, is ordered after the estimated factors,  Ft . This ordering is 
conventional in VAR and is due to the fact that monetary policy actions are supposed 
to react to information embedded in the factors at the current period and should only 
affect the factors in the next period.  
 
2.1 A comparison of the effectiveness of quantity-based with price-based 
monetary policies  
In the first part of the analysis we compare the effectiveness of four specific monetary 
policy measures undertaken by the PBC. We estimate the FAVAR four times, each 
with a different policy shock to Yt, as follows: (i) increasing the Reserve Requirement 
Ratio by 0.5 percentage point; (ii) tightening the M1 year-on-year growth rate by 5 
percentage point; (iii) raising the 1-year benchmark lending rate by 0.09 percentage 
point and (iv) raising the 1-year benchmark deposit rate by 0.09 percentage point.  
Using the FAVAR allows us to work with a large dataset and therefore we include all 
maturities of deposit rates and their spreads in the data. In order to construct our 
dataset, we combine the yield curve data with other economic data and extract factors 
from this single dataset for the FAVAR model. Extracting factors this way allows the 
yield curve information to interact with other economic data during the factor 
extraction process. The factors can then explain more variation of the data than an 
extraction process where there is an additional “yield curve factor”.  
We then compare the impulse response functions of the four policy actions stated 
earlier. 
 
2.2 Including yield curve factors in the 1-year benchmark lending rate policy 
In the second part of the analysis we compare the impulse response functions of 
the1-year benchmark lending rate with and without the yield curve factors. Since the 
PBC controls the lending yield curve, the yield curve information could also enter the 
FAVAR as part of the monetary policy. We try to extract yield curve factors from the 
benchmark lending rates, and include them in Yt in equation (2).  
We then compare the impulse response functions of the 1-year benchmark lending 
rate with and without the yield curve factors.  
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3. The data 
The dataset consists of 120 monthly China macroeconomic time series from January 
1998 to November 2009. The sample length is constrained by the availability of data. 
Although we would like to include more indicators in our sample, many of them were 
not available until 2004. The data are sourced from Bloomberg and CEIC, both of 
which are credible compilers of official data. The series are transformed to be 
stationary. The list of the series and their transformations are listed in Appendix A. 
The variables in the dataset are real activity indicators, asset prices and consumer 
prices, sentiment indicators, interbank activities and rates, bank activities, exchange 
rate and foreign exchange reserves, and the PBC policy instruments. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Section 4.1 presents results from the FAVAR where factors are extracted from a 
dataset that combines the yield curve data with other economic data. Section 4.2 
presents yield curve factors that are extracted from benchmark lending rates as well as 
results of the FAVAR that include the yield curve factors as policy instruments in 
FAVAR. 
 
4.1 Comparison of effectiveness of quantity-based with price-based monetary 
policies 
As mentioned earlier, we estimate the FAVAR four times, each with a different policy 
shock to Yt, namely, increasing the reserve requirement ratio by 0.5 percentage point, 
tightening the year-on-year growth rate of M1 by 5 percentage point, raising the 
1-year benchmark lending rate by 0.09 percentage point and raising the 1-year 
benchmark deposit rate by 0.09 percentage point.  
In this section, we include the yield curve data with other economic data and form 
only one dataset and extract factors from this dataset for the FAVAR model.  
 
4.1.1 Number of factors and lags 
To proceed to the FAVAR model stated above, it is important to know the optimal 
number of factors and lags to be incorporated in the FAVAR framework of equation 
(2).  
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In order to justify the number of factors and lags used in the FAVAR model, this paper 
tries to apply the conventional information criterion for standard VAR in the FAVAR. 
AIC, HQ and SC are computed. We find that AIC and HQ decrease with the number 
of factors, and therefore we cannot find the optimal number of factors using AIC and 
HQ. One of the reasons might be that AIC and HQ do not impose enough penalty to 
determine the optimal number of factors in VAR in equation (2). On the contrary, 
using SC as the information criteria we can find the optimal number of factors and 
lags in equation (2). 
Table 2 reports the SC scores. SC scores for policy shock in reserve requirement ratio, 
M1 growth rate, 1-year benchmark lending rate and 1-year benchmark deposit rate are 
reported in Table 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. The optimal number of factors is 4, 
6, 7, and 5 for reserve requirement ratio, M1 growth rate, 1-year benchmark lending 
rate and 1-year benchmark deposit rate respectively. The optimal lag length is 6 
months for reserve requirement ratio, 1-year benchmark lending rate and 1-year 
benchmark deposit rate, and 3 months for the growth rate of M1. 
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Tables of Information Criteria, SC, for the selection of number of factors, K, and number of lags.  
Note: .. represents the occurrence of singular matrix in computation. 
 
Table 2.1 Table of SC with respect to policy shock of reserve requirement ratio +0.50% 
K        lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 -0.9294 -0.8967 -1.9626 -1.9620 -1.9472 -1.9217 -1.8782 -1.8403 -1.7945 -1.7531 -1.7074 -1.6599 -1.6163 -1.5685 -1.5312
1 -2.2678 -2.2267 -3.0993 -2.9812 -2.9642 -2.8924 -2.7506 -2.5948 -2.4357 -2.3174 -2.1620 -2.0333 -2.0196 -1.9766 -1.8638
2 -3.9085 -3.3750 -4.7428 -4.5545 -4.5337 -4.4454 -4.2237 -3.9719 -3.6927 -3.4921 -3.3117 -3.3834 -3.2537 -2.9996 -2.8471
3 -5.6747 -5.5053 -6.3581 -6.0418 -5.8366 -5.6126 -5.2876 -4.8346 -4.4000 -4.1939 -3.8609 -3.6727 -3.3422 -2.9849 -2.8630
4 -0.0081 -0.0077 -0.0083 -0.0078 -0.0074 -7.0020 -6.5193 -5.9013 -5.2258 -4.8274 -4.3802 -3.9008 -3.3675 -2.9384 -2.7068
5 -0.0103 -0.0098 -0.0100 -0.0092 -0.0086 -0.0080 -0.0074 -6.5368 -5.7229 -5.1522 -4.6303 -4.2529 -3.6400 -2.9678 -3.3289
6 -0.0122 -0.0118 -0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0093 -0.0085 -0.0078 -6.4543 -5.4705 -4.7647 -4.2280 -3.7412 -3.7660 -4.1771 -5.7331
7 -0.0139 -0.0131 -0.0123 -0.0107 -0.0095 -0.0084 -0.0076 -5.9060 -5.0966 -4.3810 -4.2194 -3.4458 -4.8057 -0.0098 ..
8 -0.0158 -0.0147 -0.0134 -0.0116 -0.0100 -0.0087 -0.0077 -6.1186 -5.5572 -4.5283 -4.6771 -4.6537 -0.0109 .. ..
9 -0.0175 -0.0159 -0.0141 -0.0120 -0.0103 -0.0088 -0.0073 -5.8695 -4.9059 -4.4837 -4.7386 -0.0188 .. .. ..
10 -0.0192 -0.0172 -0.0148 -0.0122 -0.0101 -0.0082 -0.0068 -5.4828 -5.1881 -0.0087 -0.0512 .. .. .. ..
11 -0.0211 -0.0184 -0.0154 -0.0127 -0.0103 -0.0082 -0.0069 -6.3173 -6.6719 -0.0190 .. .. .. .. ..
12 -0.0227 -0.0196 -0.0162 -0.0130 -0.0101 -0.0081 -0.0069 -0.0084 -0.0136 .. .. .. .. .. ..
13 -0.0248 -0.0212 -0.0173 -0.0137 -0.0106 -0.0092 -0.0095 -0.0128 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
14 -0.0265 -0.0221 -0.0178 -0.0138 -0.0109 -0.0100 -0.0123 -0.0582 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
15 -0.0281 -0.0232 -0.0182 -0.0140 -0.0112 -0.0116 -0.0170 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  
 
Table 2.2 Table of SC with respect to policy shock of M1 growth rate -0.50% 
K        lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 1.8939 1.8987 1.9407 1.9820 2.0252 2.0639 2.0551 2.0984 2.1392 2.1814 2.2236 2.1980 2.2363 2.2511 2.2616
1 0.6240 0.6560 0.8071 0.9436 1.0497 1.1593 1.2195 1.3498 1.4954 1.6255 1.7721 1.7627 1.8062 1.7620 1.8674
2 -1.0976 -0.9356 -0.6917 -0.4294 -0.2071 0.0124 -0.0092 0.1921 0.4478 0.6856 0.8164 0.6992 0.7001 0.8460 1.1654
3 -2.7078 -2.5561 -2.1817 -1.7412 -1.3975 -0.9904 -0.8698 -0.4569 0.0346 0.3921 0.6951 0.8025 0.7667 1.2029 1.6486
4 -5.0637 -4.7141 -4.0785 -3.4001 -2.9762 -2.3571 -2.0418 -1.5765 -0.8255 -0.3011 0.1370 0.4586 0.7661 1.2585 1.8903
5 -0.0073 -6.7869 -5.8559 -4.9098 -4.2692 -3.4858 -3.1336 -2.3186 -1.5515 -0.7329 -0.1244 0.4317 0.7167 1.5249 2.1675
6 -0.0090 -0.0084 -7.0007 -5.6820 -4.7114 -3.7316 -3.2824 -2.1419 -1.2664 -0.3065 0.1144 0.6083 0.8974 0.9302 -0.3836
7 -0.0107 -0.0096 -0.0079 -6.2281 -4.8103 -3.5250 -3.0850 -1.6200 -0.7571 0.2559 0.7535 0.9795 0.8354 -1.6206 ..
8 -0.0126 -0.0110 -0.0088 -6.8191 -5.0808 -3.5316 -2.7861 -1.2137 -0.0101 0.7471 1.0659 -0.2335 -5.4257 .. ..
9 -0.0142 -0.0122 -0.0094 -6.9602 -4.8509 -3.1074 -2.1253 -0.6093 0.5176 .. .. .. .. .. ..
10 -0.0195 -0.0137 -0.0105 -0.0076 -4.8985 -2.8897 -2.1233 -0.7761 0.1399 .. .. .. .. .. ..
11 -0.0231 -0.0150 -0.0111 -0.0079 -4.6976 -2.7224 -2.2618 -0.7161 -1.4024 .. .. .. .. .. ..
12 -0.0251 -0.0162 -0.0117 -0.0080 -4.3981 -2.7308 -2.3280 -1.6358 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
13 -0.0122 -0.0176 -0.0127 -0.0087 -5.1488 -4.1195 -4.4517 -0.0080 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
14 -0.0137 -0.0185 -0.0129 -0.0084 -5.1489 -4.3133 -6.5393 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
15 -0.0251 -0.0199 -0.0138 -0.0089 -5.8966 -6.3670 -0.0106 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  
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(Continue) Tables of Information Criteria, SC, for the selection of number of factors, K, and number of lags.  
Note: .. represents the occurrence of singular matrix in computation. 
Table 2.3 Table of SC with respect to policy shock of 1-year benchmark lending rate +0.09% 
K        lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 -0.1558 -1.1765 -0.2232 -0.2026 -0.2234 -0.1865 -0.3637 -0.3899 -0.3537 -0.3248 -0.2914 -0.3388 -0.3372 -0.3009 -0.2636
1 -1.4391 -1.4399 -1.4202 -1.3434 -1.2572 -1.1125 -1.1708 -1.0867 -0.9396 -0.8071 -0.6818 -0.6431 -0.6699 -0.6941 -0.5603
2 -4.3799 -4.2116 -4.2567 -4.0718 -3.9286 -3.6198 -3.5646 -3.3499 -3.0850 -2.8014 -2.6698 -2.975 -2.6091 -2.4832 -2.2591
3 -5.9790 -5.8175 -5.7641 -5.4031 -5.0560 -4.5858 -4.4664 -4.0090 -3.5077 -3.0497 -2.7686 -2.7803 -2.6674 -2.2798 -1.8647
4 -0.0085 -0.0081 -0.0078 -7.1518 -6.5544 -5.9069 -5.6637 -5.1736 -4.5203 -3.9513 -3.6914 -3.4676 -3.0514 -2.7582 -2.4367
5 -0.0108 -0.0102 -0.0096 -0.0087 -0.0079 -6.9720 -6.5298 -5.8472 -5.0807 -4.2694 -3.8315 -3.4687 -2.7402 -2.3215 -2.0435
6 -0.0125 -0.0117 -0.0106 -0.0094 -0.0083 -7.1687 -6.5727 -5.5891 -4.6449 -3.8719 -3.4522 -3.0686 -3.0833 -2.8857 -3.8666
7 -0.0142 -0.0129 -0.0115 -0.0100 -0.0084 -7.1959 -6.4759 -5.1465 -4.0468 -3.5400 -3.2801 -3.0798 -4.7059 -7.0904 ..
8 -0.0160 -0.0146 -0.0127 -0.0108 -0.0089 -7.1262 -6.4579 -5.0722 -4.2501 -3.6734 -3.7802 -4.6843 -0.0115 ..
9 -0.0177 -0.0158 -0.0135 -0.0113 -0.0091 -7.0647 -6.1097 -4.6709 -3.3967 -3.5516 -6.3326 -0.0226 ..
10 -0.0195 -0.0171 -0.0142 -0.0114 -0.0088 -6.5409 -5.5387 -4.1606 -3.4312 -5.9120 -0.0557 ..
11 -0.0214 -0.0184 -0.0149 -0.0119 -0.0089 -6.5622 -5.7860 -4.7080 -4.8704 -0.0157 ..
12 -0.0231 -0.0198 -0.0160 -0.0122 -0.0087 -6.4331 -5.5659 -5.8139 -0.0106 ..
13 -0.0254 -0.0217 -0.0172 -0.0130 -0.0092 -0.0074 -0.0078 -0.0106 ..
14 -0.0271 -0.0227 -0.0177 -0.0131 -0.0094 -0.0087 -0.0108 .. ..
15 -0.0286 -0.0236 -0.0180 -0.0133 -0.0096 -0.0095 -0.0155 .. ..  
Table 2.4 Table of SC with respect to policy shock of 1-year benchmark deposit rate +0.09% 
K        lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 -0.2533 -0.2416 -0.2123 -0.1789 -0.1453 -0.1139 -0.1551 -0.1249 -0.0990 -0.0789 -0.0459 -0.1587 -0.1715 -0.1296 -0.0871
1 -1.5144 -1.4868 -1.3872 -1.2619 -1.1789 -1.0610 -0.9877 -0.8742 -0.7395 -0.6220 -0.4832 -0.5107 -0.5589 -0.4908 -0.3596
2 -4.4562 -4.2365 -4.0572 -3.8458 -3.6925 -3.5404 -4.1307 -3.9020 -3.6611 -3.4152 -3.1664 -3.7648 -3.6058 -3.4467 -3.1247
3 -6.0570 -5.8735 -5.5674 -5.2457 -4.9370 -4.6025 -5.0072 -4.6446 -4.2030 -3.8385 -3.5201 -3.8677 -3.5927 -3.1863 -2.7843
4 -0.0084 -0.0080 -0.0075 -6.9436 -6.5607 -6.0227 -6.1856 -5.6526 -4.9310 -4.4307 -4.4389 -4.3860 -3.7838 -3.3515 -2.8180
5 -0.0107 -0.0101 -0.0093 -0.0084 -0.0078 -7.1382 -7.1056 -6.3960 -5.4701 -4.7584 -4.6238 -4.4275 -3.7790 -3.4356 -3.4362
6 -0.0125 -0.0117 -0.0105 -0.0093 -0.0084 -0.0077 -0.0075 -6.6554 -5.6311 -4.7288 -4.4283 -4.2336 -3.6524 -4.3770 -5.6972
7 -0.0142 -0.0130 -0.0114 -0.0098 -0.0086 -0.0076 -0.0074 -6.0845 -4.9437 -4.1534 -4.1479 -4.3122 -4.5357 -0.0078 ..
8 -0.0161 -0.0147 -0.0127 -0.0107 -0.0092 -0.0077 -0.0074 -5.8768 -5.0550 -3.9366 -4.4519 -6.3874 -0.0106 .. ..
9 -0.0178 -0.0159 -0.0134 -0.0111 -0.0093 -0.0077 -0.0071 -5.8093 -4.6118 -3.9783 -6.7592 -0.0220 .. .. ..
10 -0.0196 -0.0171 -0.0140 -0.0111 -0.0088 -6.9465 -0.0062 -5.3093 -4.3301 -6.5647 .. .. .. .. ..
11 -0.0215 -0.0184 -0.0148 -0.0114 -0.0088 -0.0073 -0.0066 -5.7424 -6.0814 -0.0200 .. .. .. .. ..
12 -0.0232 -0.0199 -0.0157 -0.0120 -0.0089 -0.0074 -0.0068 -6.1099 -0.0130 .. .. .. .. .. ..
13 -0.0254 -0.0216 -0.0168 -0.0126 -0.0096 -0.0086 -0.0095 -0.0117 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
14 -0.0271 -0.0225 -0.0172 -0.0126 -0.0095 -0.0097 -0.0118 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
15 -0.0288 -0.0237 -0.0177 -0.0131 -0.0103 -0.0117 -0.0178 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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4.1.2. A comparison of the four policy tools 
Graph 3 displays the impulse response functions from the four policy tools.  
In general, all the four policies do not have long term impact on real activities. The 1-year lending rate has 
the most impact on real activities in the short term. A shock on the growth rate of M1, the 1-year lending 
rate and the 1-year deposit rate have small long term impact on CPI inflation, while a shock on the reserve 
requirement ratio does not have any long term impact on CPI inflation.  
A comparison of the impact of the four policies on real activities 
As can be seen from Graph 3, a shock represented by an increase in reserve requirement ratio by 0.5 
percentage point affects real activities very mildly. It could be that an increase in the reserve requirement 
ratio is an indication of the start of a tightening cycle. A drop in enterprise deposits could be due to tighter 
funding from banks and therefore enterprises begin to use their deposit to fund their operation or 
investment projects. At the same time, there is a mild fall in the growth rates of industrial production, 
exports and FDI. The impact of the shock on exports and FDI is also reflected in a mild fall in the growth 
rate of foreign exchange reserves. The shock has a mild negative impact on the growth rate of average 
earnings. This should be related to the slower growth in industrial production. The shock of the increased 
reserve requirement ratio does not bring about a fall in fixed asset investment until the 24
th
 month. A shock 
on 1-year deposit rate has a similar but milder impact on real activities. 
Again as Graph 3 shows, a shock represented by the tightening of the growth rate of M1 by 5 percentage 
points affects real activities in ways that are similar to that of the increase in the reserve requirement ratio 
of 0.5 percentage point. The only difference in the effect on real activities between the two monetary policy 
instruments is that a tightening in reserve requirement ratio leads to slight appreciation of CNY for 12 
months while a tightening on M1 leads to slight and gradual depreciation of CNY. The difference is also 
reflected in the impact on FDI and foreign exchange reserves. A shock on the growth rate of M1 leads to an 
increase in FDI in the first 6 months, but the impact is neutral in long term. The shock has a similar but 
more extended impact on foreign exchange reserves, and only disappears after 40 months. 
A shock represented by an increase in the 1-year lending rate by 0.09 percentage point has the most 
negative impacts on real activities in short to medium term compared with the other policy tools, especially 
for industrial production growth and fixed asset investment growth. These impacts disappear after 42 
months. The shock has negligible impact on CNY and FDI.  
A shocks represented by the increase in the 1-year lending rate and M1 growth rate yield similar results in 
the fall of enterprise deposit growth rate. An increase in lending rate or a tightening of M1 growth via 
lower monthly growth of new loan means that enterprises would use their deposits to fund their operations 
or expansions. 
A comparison of the impact of the four policies on asset prices and inflation 
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Of all the four policies, a shock to the reserve requirement ratio negatively affects consumer expectations, 
the return of Shanghai A share and housing price most for the first 18 months. At the same time household 
deposits increase and the growth rate of retail sales falls. The shock also brings down the inflation in urban 
CPI most among the four policies for the same period. Households tend to channel their investment from 
the stock market and property market back to savings. This might suggest that household investment 
channels are limited in China. These negative impacts only last for 18 months, and they do not display any 
long term impacts from the shock. A shock to the 1-year deposit rate has a similar impact on asset prices 
and inflation, but is milder. 
A shock to the growth rate of M1 affects consumer expectation, the returns of Shanghai A share and 
household deposits, but the effects are milder than the shock to the reserve requirement ratio. A shock to 
the growth rate of M1 has the least impact on the housing price index among the four policies. It also has a 
milder impact on CPI inflation in the short term with the impact lasting for 48 months. 
In contrast to the other three policies, a shock to the 1-year lending rate leads to a rise in consumer 
expectation, higher return on Shanghai A shares and a fall in household deposits. But again, it suggests that 
household deposit is an alternative to stock investments. Although the mortgage rate is linked to the 1-year 
lending rate, a shock to the 1-year lending rate only has a small impact on the change in housing prices, but 
this small impact lingers on for 30 months. Although the shock of 1-year lending rate has only mild impact 
on CPI inflation, the impact lasts 48 months. 
Overall, we find that inflation in China is affected by household investments in asset markets in the short 
term and is affected by retail sales in the long term. Consumer expectation plays an important role in 
inflation. Among all the policy tools in the short term, the reserve requirement ratio seems to affect 
consumer expectation and household investment behavior the most.  
A comparison of the impact of the four policies on credit channels 
A shock to the reserve requirement ratio reduces the growth rate of M1 slightly during the 3
rd
 month to the 
20
th
 month. This echoes the fall in urban CPI inflation during the same period. But the shock to the reserve 
requirement ratio leads to a very mild growth in monthly new loans for the same period. The shock 
increases 7-day CHIBOR within the first six months mildly, but leads to a stronger increase in 3-month 
CHIBOR. These impacts last for 36 months.  
A shock to the growth rate of M1 affects CHIBOR in the same way as a shock to reserve requirement ratio 
but is milder. However, a shock on M1 leads to a slight fall in monthly new loan growth, but this is only for 
the first 4 months.  
A shock to the 1-year lending rate leads to a small increase in the 7-day and 3-month CHIBOR but these 
effects decline after 6 months. The shock also leads to a small increase in the growth rate of M1 in the short 
term, while falling gradually in the medium term with the impact disappearing after 42 months. This might 
be explained by the impact of the shock to a fall in household deposits; in fact, the impact on household 
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deposits matches the timing of the growth rate of M1.  
A shock to the 1-year deposit rate leads to a rise in monthly new loan growth. This might be due to the fact 
that the higher deposit rate attracts more household deposits and hence banks have more funds to deploy. 
However, the shock has a small impact on M1 growth rate, as the growth in household deposits and 
increase in monthly new loans cancel out the impact of the growth in money.  
The findings match the stylized facts of a tightening monetary policy shock on impulse response functions. 
There is a long run neutrality of monetary policy on real economic activities, as shown by a fall in the 
impulse response function of real economic activities in the short term with the impacts disappearing in the 
long term. There is also a fall in inflation in the long term and a short term rise in interest rates. These 
results are similar to the ones found in the literature in the context of other economies. 
Our result is only partially similar to that of Girardin and Liu (2006) as we find that the price-based tools of 
a 1-year lending rate has a stronger impact on real activities in the short term when compared to 
quantity-based tools. However, our findings differ from Qin et al (2005) and Laurens and Maino (2007) 
and Dickinson and Liu (2007) that find price-based tools as not having any long term impact on inflation.  
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Graph 3. Comparison of IRFs of the 4 policy actions.  
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Graph 3 (continue)  Comparison of the 4 policy actions 
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Graph 3 (continue)  Comparison of the 4 policy actions   
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Graph 3 (continue)  Comparison of the 4 policy actions  
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Graph 3 (continue)  Comparison of the 4 policy actions 
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
CNY
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
M1
 
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Exports
RRR +0.5 percentage point
M1 yoy growth rate -5.0 percentage point
1Y Lending Rate +0.09 percentage point
1Y Deposit Rate +0.09 percentage point
Page 24 / 42 
4.2 Including yield curve factors in the 1-year benchmark lending rate policy 
Since we would like to know if the yield curve information, specifically the level, slope and curvature of 
the yield curve, could improve the analysis of the 1-year benchmark lending rate, we extract 3 factors from 
benchmark lending rates and their spreads by principal components. Table 3 shows the factor loadings of 
the three factors. 
Table 3. Yield curve factors of benchmark lending rates 
Lending Rates and Spreads Factor Loading 1 Factor Loading 2 Factor Loading 3
1M~3M 1.0833 -0.3993 -0.2735
6M 1.0242 -0.6326 -1.3867
1Y 1.0483 -0.7980 -0.4344
3y~5Y 1.0961 -0.1226 -0.2151
>5Y 1.0970 0.0569 -0.2131
1Y-6M spread 0.8694 -1.0742 2.3389
3Y-1Y spread 0.8786 1.6476 0.4142
5Y-1Y spread 0.8637 1.7079 0.2825  
As shown in Table 3, the first factor has loadings heavily weighted on the levels of benchmark lending 
rates. We call the first factor, Level factor. Heavy weights are given to the lending rate spreads in the 
second factor. Therefore we call this the Slope factor. In the third factor, heavy weights are given to the 
6-month lending rate and the spread of 1-year lending rate and 6-month lending rate. These weights 
characterize “valleys” in the lending yield curve as shown in Graph 2, and therefore we call this factor the 
Shape factor.  
Recall of Graph 2. The PBC’s Lending Rate Yield Curve during 2008~2009. 
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In Yt of equation (2), we arrange the factors in the order such that Shape factor comes first, then the Slope 
factor, and then the 1-year benchmark lending rate. The policy shock is the same as the first part of the 
analysis where only the 1-year benchmark lending rate receives a shock of +0.09 percentage point. We do 
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not include the Level factor in Yt because a shock to the 1-year lending rate could not change lending rates 
of other maturities since they are separate PBC policy actions; but a shock to the 1-year lending rate could 
change the slope and curvature of the yield curve. 
 
4.2.1 The number of factors and lags 
Using the conventional information criteria, SC, we find that the optimal number of factors is 8 and the 
optimal number of lags is 5 for the FAVAR model. Table 4 displays the information criteria. 
Table 4 Information criteria, SC, for 1-year lending rate with yield curve factors included in FAVAR. 
Note: .. represents the occurrence of singular matrix in computation. 
K     
 lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 -1.7833 -1.7016 -1.9864 -1.8296 -1.9274 -1.9532 -2.6352 -2.5511 -2.3199 -2.0957 -1.9589 -2.4728 -2.2452 -2.0450 -1.7674
1 -2.6714 -2.4752 -2.6274 -2.2807 -2.1241 -1.9790 -2.4996 -2.2614 -1.8289 -1.3745 -1.0369 -1.4044 -1.3795 -1.0115 -0.5953
2 -4.5829 -4.3595 -4.2942 -3.7891 -3.4845 -3.3308 -3.4248 -2.9705 -2.3129 -1.5870 -1.0538 -1.2549 -1.2305 -0.6915 -0.3030
3 -0.0074 -6.8256 -6.5203 -5.8228 -5.3005 -4.8820 -4.9850 -4.3521 -3.6698 -2.9458 -2.6903 -2.7252 -2.1252 -1.6382 -1.5675
4 -0.0099 -0.0089 -0.0082 -6.8820 -6.2797 -5.6026 -5.6369 -4.8146 -4.0973 -3.2434 -2.9675 -3.1195 -3.0647 -4.0248 -4.3271
5 -0.0120 -0.0107 -0.0096 -0.0082 -7.0102 -6.0842 -5.9258 -4.6557 -3.8164 -2.8513 -3.0529 -3.8201 -3.8181 -4.0032 ..
6 -0.0136 -0.0121 -0.0104 -0.0085 -7.1410 -6.0875 -5.7946 -4.3649 -3.2870 -2.8854 -5.0573 -0.0197 .. .. ..
7 -0.0152 -0.0133 -0.0110 -0.0088 -7.0047 -5.8060 -5.4065 -3.5703 -2.5840 -2.8686 -0.0287 .. .. .. ..
8 -0.0170 -0.0147 -0.0119 -0.0093 -7.1475 -5.4786 -5.5585 -4.3002 -4.1546 -6.2980 .. .. .. .. ..
9 -0.0185 -0.0156 -0.0122 -0.0092 -6.5629 -4.5316 -4.7672 -3.8149 -6.5213 -0.0206 .. .. .. .. ..
10 -0.0201 -0.0167 -0.0127 -0.0092 -6.2553 -4.0649 -4.0769 -5.2498 -0.0151 .. .. .. .. .. ..
11 -0.0221 -0.0182 -0.0136 -0.0097 -6.5971 -4.2295 -4.8455 -0.0087 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
12 -0.0241 -0.0196 -0.0145 -0.0100 -6.7700 -4.7849 -6.5909 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
13 -0.0263 -0.0214 -0.0155 -0.0105 -0.0076 -6.5591 -0.0119 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
14 -0.0280 -0.0222 -0.0157 -0.0105 -0.0078 -0.0088 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
15 -0.0295 -0.0232 -0.0159 -0.0108 -0.0079 -0.0111 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 
4.2.2 A comparison of the effectiveness of 1-year benchmark lending rate with and without yield 
curve factors 
Graph 4 compares the differences of impulse response functions of a shock on 1-year lending rate with and 
without yield curve factors. 
Adding yield curve factors to the FAVAR does not make a large difference to the impulse response 
functions of the 1-year lending rate on real activities and inflation in the long term.  
However, it changes the impulse response functions in the credit channels. After including the yield curve 
factors, the immediate impact of a shock of 1-year lending rate on 7-day CHIBOR is stronger. In Section 
4.1.2, Graph 3 shows that the shock has no immediate impact on 7-day CHIBOR after 1-month. Since the 
interbank short rate should respond to the policy rate very quickly, adding the yield curve factors seems 
appropriate. The shock also leads to a fall in monthly new loan growth, enterprise deposit growth and M1 
growth after including yield curve factors, which makes more sense than a small rise in the three monetary 
indicators in Section 4.2.1.
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Graph 4 Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparisons of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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Graph 4 (Cont’) Side by side comparison of IRFs with and without yield curve factors in FAVAR w.r.t. a shock of 0.09% in 1-year lending rate. 
Without Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR       With Yield Curve Factors in FAVAR 
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5. Policy Implications 
Our results find that to effectively control the rate of inflation in the short term in China consumer 
expectation have to be anchor. We also find that the reserve requirement ratio is the most effective policy 
tool among the four policies that we have examined. The PBC could continue to use this policy to anchor 
consumer expectation.  
However, this tool does not control inflation in long term. Although controlling the growth of money via 
window guidance and the price-based tool of 1-year benchmark lending rate could control inflation in long 
term, these tools distort market behavior, and therefore lead to inefficient capital allocation. 
As financial liberalization continues in China, deregulating the commercial bank interest rate is just a matter 
of time. Ultimately, the PBC would not use benchmark commercial interest rates as its interest rate policy 
tool. However, as long as the PBC continues to control the benchmark rates, these rates continue to 
influence the short term rates, e.g. CHIBOR, and therefore the development of another policy rate becomes 
difficult under the current situation. 
The PBC should consider reforming the monetary policy system towards a market-oriented system. The 
development in 2004 to reform the rediscount rate to a policy rate could continue. When liquidity in the 
banking system is tight, banks would go to the rediscount window and transaction volumes would then 
increase. That should increase the importance of the rediscount rate. The monetary tightening cycle has just 
begun; the PBC could take this opportunity to continue the reform. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the first part of this paper, we look at the effectiveness of the four PBC monetary policies, namely the 
reserve requirement ratio, the growth rate of M1, the 1-year benchmark lending rate and the 1-year 
benchmark deposit rate, on real economic activities and inflation by including the yield curve information in 
our dataset. In the second part, we first extract the yield curve factors and model them as part of the policy 
actions in the FAVAR when the policy is the 1-year benchmark lending rate. We then compare the impulse 
response functions with those in the first part. 
In general, we find that none of the four policies have any long term impact on real activities. A shock to the  
growth rate of M1, the 1-year lending rate and the 1-year deposit rate have small long term impact on CPI 
inflation, while a shock to the reserve requirement ratio does not have any long term impact on CPI 
inflation. 
We also find that inflation in China is affected by household investments in asset markets in the short term 
and is affected by retail sales in the long term. Consumer expectation plays an important role. Among all the 
policy tools, the reserve requirement ratio seems to affect consumer expectation and household investment 
behavior in the short term the most.  
After including separate yield curve factors as part of the interest rate policy, we find that the impulse 
Page 37 / 42 
response functions in the short term become more intuitive. But there are no large differences in impulse 
response functions in the long term after the separate yield curve factors are added in the model. 
In short, we find that the impulse response functions of tightening monetary policies in China follow largely 
the stylized facts that there is long run neutrality of money on real economic activities, a long term fall in 
inflation and a short term rise in interest rates. 
The reserve requirement ratio controls the short term CPI effectively, but cannot control long term inflation. 
However, the control of inflation in the long term depends on window guidance and the benchmark interest 
rate, which are not market-oriented tools and lead to inefficient capital allocation. Thus, the PBC needs to 
continue to reform the monetary policy system. 
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Appendix A  Data Description 
All series are downloaded from either Bloomberg (B) or CIEC (C). The transformation codes are: 1 – no 
transformation; 2 – first difference; 4 – logarithm; 5 – first difference of logarithm. 
 
S = slow-moving;  
F = fast-moving;   
I = policy instrument Indicator Transformation Source Ticker 
Trade 
1 S Import yoy 1 B CNFRIMPY Index 
2 S Export yoy 1 B CNFREXPY Index 
3 S Exports general merchandize yoy 1 C ceic cjhca 
4 S Assembly processing trade yoy 1 C ceic cjhcd 
5 S 
Imported Raw Materials for Processing 
Trade yoy 1 C ceic cjhce 
6 S Imports General Merchandize yoy 1 C ceic cjbca 
7 S Exports to Europe yoy 1 C ceic cjfac 
8 S Exports to Asia yoy 1 C ceic cjfaa 
9 S Exports to U.S. yoy 1 C ceic cjfci 
10 S Imports from Europe yoy 1 C ceic cjcac 
11 S Imports from Asia yoy 1 C ceic cjcaa 
12 S Imports from U.S. yoy 1 C ceic cjcag 
13 S Export Tax Rebate yoy 5 B CHGR5 Index 
14 S Import Tax yoy 5 B CHGR4 Index 
Earnings 
15 S Total Earnings yoy 1 B CHLFTWGE Index 
16 S State Owned Enterprises Earnings yoy 1 B CHLFTSTW Index 
17 S 
Collective Owned Enterprises Earnings 
yoy 1 B CHLFTCWG Index 
18 S 
Other Units (private enterprise) 
Earnings yoy 1 B CHLFTOTW Index 
19 S Business Tax yoy 5 B CHGR6 Index 
Retail Sales 
20 S Retail Sales Total Value yoy 5 B CNRSCONS Index 
21 S Local Value Added Tax yoy 5 B CHGR2 Index 
22 S Local Consumption Tax yoy 5 B CHGR3 Index 
23 S consumable retail sales yoy 5 C ceic chbaa 
24 S electronic appliances retail sales yoy 5 C ceic chaady 
25 S furniture retail sales yoy 5 C ceic chaaed 
26 S decoration retail sales yoy 5 C ceic chaaee 
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Industrial Production 
27 S Industrial Product Value-added yoy 1 B CHVAIOY Index 
28 S Industrial Production Sales yoy 1 C ceic cbfo 
29 S 
Industrial Production Sales Light 
Industries yoy 1 C ceic cbfp 
30 S 
Industrial Production Sales Heavy 
Industries yoy 1 C ceic cbfq 
Investments 
31 S Fixed Asset Investments yoy 5 C ceic coba cobdju 
32 S 
Commodity Housing Transaction 
Volume yoy 5 C ceic cecb 
33 S 
Non-Cumulative FDI realized utilization 
yoy 5 C CEIC COQCB 
Sentiment 
34 F Consumer Confidence 1 B CHCSCONF Index 
35 F Consumer Expectation 1 B CHCSEXPC Index 
36 F Econ-Business Cycle Signal 1 B CNCIBCS Index 
37 F Econ-Leading Index 1 B CNCILI Index 
38 F Econ-Coincident Index 1 B CNCICI Index 
39 S Econ-Lagging Index 1 B CNCILAI Index 
40 F Housing Price Index 1 C ceic ceqbpv 
Stock Prices 
41 F Shanghai A Share Index yoy 5 B SHASHR Index 
42 F Shanghai B Share Index yoy 5 B SHBSHR Index 
43 F Shenzhen A Share Index yoy 5 B SZASHR Index 
44 F Shenzhen B Share Index yoy 5 B SZBSHR Index 
Interbank Activities 
45 F 7-day repo transaction volume yoy 5 C ceic cmocc 
46 F 30-day repo transaction volume yoy 5 C ceic cmoce 
47 F 90-day repo transaction volume yoy 5 C ceic cmocg 
Interbank Rates 
48 F 7-day repo rate 1 C CEIC CMOAB 
49 F 30-day repo rate 1 C CEIC CMOAD 
50 F 90-day repo rate 1 C CEIC CMOAF 
51 F CHIBOR 7D 1 B IBO007 Index 
52 F CHIBOR 3M 1 B IBO03M Index 
53 F CHIBOR7D Savings1Y spread 1 B IBO007 - CNDR1Y 
54 F CHIBOR3M savings1Y Spread 1 B IBO03M - CNDR1Y 
Money and Credits 
55 S Enterprises deposits yoy 5 B CHBDENTP Index 
56 S Household deposits yoy 5 B CHBDHH Index 
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57 F Monthly New Loan yoy 5 B CNLNNEW Index 
58 S Foreign exchange reserves yoy 5 B CNGFOREX Index 
Consumer Prices 
59 S Rural CPI yoy 1 B CNCPIRUR Index 
60 S Urban CPI yoy 1 B CNCPIURB Index 
Exchange Rate 
61 S RMB against USD 1 B CNY Curncy 
Monetary Policy Instruments 
62 I Reserve requirement ratio 1 B CHRRDEP Index  
63 I Rediscount rate 1 B CNDSC Index  
64 I M1 yoy 1 B CNMS1YOY Index  
65 I Lending 1-3M 1 B CHLR1-3Y Index  
66 I Lending 3-5M 1 B CHLR3-5Y Index  
67 I Lending 6M 1 B CHLR6M Index  
68 I Lending 1Y 1 B CHLR12M Index  
69 I Lending 3-5Y 1 B CHLR3-5Y Index  
70 I Lending 5Y above 1 B CHLR5YA Index  
71 I Saving 3M 1 B CNDR3M Index  
72 I Saving 6M 1 B CNDR6M Index  
73 I Saving 1Y 1 B CNDR1Y Index  
74 I Saving 3Y 1 B CNDR3Y Index  
75 I Saving 5Y 1 B CNDR5Y Index  
Policy Interest Rate Spreads 
76 I 1Y Lending Deposit Spread 1 B CHLR12M - CNDR1Y  
77 I 1Y3M deposit spread 1 B CNDR1Y - CNDR3M  
78 I 1Y6M deposit spread 1 B CNDR1Y - CNDR6M  
79 I 3Y1Y deposit spread 1 B CNDR3Y - CNDR1Y  
80 I 5Y1Y deposit spread 1 B CNDRY5Y - CNDR1Y  
81 I 1Y6M lending spread 1 B CHLR12M - CHLR6M  
82 I 3Y1Y lending spread 1 B CHLR3-5Y - CHLR12M  
83 I 5Y1Y lending spread 1 B CHLR5YA - CHLR12M  
 
